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Sovereignty and Tragedy in Contemporary Critiques of 
Investor State Dispute Settlement 
 
Paul Robert Gilbert 
 
What happens to sovereign power as it drains away from 
the modern state, to the extent that it does drain away? 
When it flows out of the nation-state, does it flow into 
some other container? 
– Joan Cocks, On sovereignty and other political delusions, 





Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which makes it possible for foreign investors to sue 
host states in arbitral tribunals, has been at the centre of recent mobilisations against 
claimed trade injustices.1 Critics tend to identify ISDS as epitomising neoliberalism or neo-
imperialism in international law, or as a hybrid of these two. My intention in this essay is not 
to undermine such critiques but rather to examine the work that the concept of sovereignty 
does within them and to consider the possible tragic quality of proposals that point towards 
political action focused on reclaiming sovereignty. I argue that, when critiques of ISDS are 
couched in terms of sovereignty lost by states to corporations, critics find themselves 
implicitly working with ‘two types of sovereign power: a “bad”, dominative type…and a 
“good” emancipatory type’.2 When corporate sovereignty is depicted as a ‘bad’ dominative 
type, it is often implied that, if returned to states (or communities) sovereignty would 
function as the ‘good’, emancipatory type. And yet, as Joan Cocks observes, struggles for 
freedom through sovereignty can be dangerous, frequently recreating the injuries they seek 
to escape.3 But we can go further and ask not only about the salience of the concept of 
sovereignty for critiques of ISDS and international investment law, but also about the 
                                                          
1See M-B Dembour & N Stammers ‘Introduction’ London Review of International Law, this issue. 
2 J Cocks On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions (Bloomsbury, 2014) 40. 
3 Ibid 10. 
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temporal mismatch between critiques that appear to respond to historical, anti-colonial 
concerns about sovereignty, and the coordinates of our own contemporary problem-space.4 
 
The essay proceeds by, firstly, providing some background to my conceptual orientation. It 
then goes on, secondly, to examine the particular place that sovereignty occupies in existing 
critiques of ISDS and international investment law. The third section draws on ethnographic 
fieldwork carried out with lawyers and activists in Bangladesh, who are concerned with the 
treatment of Bangladesh in a number of ISDS cases brought by transnational oil, gas and 
mining companies. Arguably, the violent treatment of protestors by the Bangladeshi state 
highlights the fatal flaw involved in critiquing ISDS on the basis of sovereignty loss or 
erosion. In the final section, I move to London in 2016, where campaigns against the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) couched in terms of a loss of 
sovereignty to transnational corporations rubbed uncomfortably up against efforts to regain 
sovereignty via the Brexit vote. The conclusion argues for a more timely critique of ISDS and 
international investment law; one that avoids echoing regressive ‘post-neoliberal’ politics, or 
equating post-colonial sovereignty with decolonisation and emancipation. 
 
B. Conceptual Background 
 
My arguments in this essay are inspired by an emerging body of work in postcolonial 
studies, anthropology and international law which grapples with the relationship between 
the temporal context in which critique is articulated, and the forms of expectation those 
critiques nourish and engender.5 David Scott reminds us that colonialism was pictured by 
early anti-colonial writers and politicians as a totalising system of degradation and thus only 
‘a sharp expression of the anticolonial demand—the unequivocal demand for immediate 
sovereignty’—could satisfy the requirements of critique in the interwar and post-WWII 
years.6 Scott argues that revolutionary anticolonial tracts demanding sovereignty as 
                                                          
4 D Scott Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Duke, 2004) 79. 
5 See especially D Scott Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice (Duke, 2014); G Wilde Freedom 
Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Duke, 2015); and most recently S Pahuja ‘Letters 
from Bandung: Encounters with Another International Law’ in L Eslava, M Fakhri and V Nesia (eds) Bandung, 
Global History and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (Cambridge, 2017).  
6 Scott (2004) 95. 
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vindication could once have been read as romantic, offering as they did a narrative of 
overcoming and redemption. Yet such critiques now appear ‘untimely’ insofar as 
‘revolutionary anticolonialism’s dream of national sovereignty [has become] a historically 
superseded and politically obsolete future past’ and, therefore, ‘can no longer meaningfully 
animate emancipatory projects in our radically transformed conditions’. 7 In other words, 
critiques which culminate in a demand for the realisation of sovereignty appear exhausted-  
out of step with a present in which post-colonial sovereignty is a fragmented achievement 
rather than an emancipatory promise, and no longer able to point towards revolutionary 
political projects. It is in this sense, for Scott, that such critiques  have also taken on a tragic 
character. I suggest in this essay that the same holds true for scholars who present 
international investment law as neo-imperial, and critique ISDS on the basis that such 
mechanisms precipitate a loss of sovereignty for contemporary postcolonial states. 
 
In a similar manner, critiques couched in terms of neoliberal governance can also take on a 
tragic aspect. To the extent that critiques of ISDS as neoliberal identify the excess 
sovereignty of markets or corporations as the problem, a resurgent popular or state 
sovereignty often becomes the answer that this critique demands. When critical legal 
scholars root their analyses of neoliberalism in Foucault, who ‘does not quite manage to 
escape its ideal-typical definition as, most notably, a politics inclined towards 
deterritorialisation’,8 it is re-territorialisation, or in Polanyian terms ‘re-embedding’ in the 
‘sovereign dynamics’ of land and community,9 that presents itself as the answer to the 
critique of ISDS. The mode of politics, often referred to as populist but also increasingly 
referred to as post-neoliberal, now characterises the putative neoliberal heartlands of 
Britain and the USA and has already exposed the violence encoded by explicit calls to re-
enchant an economistic national politics through the reassertion of sovereignty.  
 
Polanyi’s embeddedness concept has been put to a range of uses by international lawyers 
and other social scientists, and this diversity of application can at least in part be attributed 
                                                          
7 G Wilde (2015) 15, 37. 
8 A Mitropoulos Contract and Contagion: From Biopolitics to Oikonomia (Minor Compositions, 2012) 136. 
9 Ibid 158. 
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to Polanyi’s own inconsistent and constantly evolving use of the term. 10 One common 
interpretation of Polanyi’s The Great Transformation is that, rather than critiquing the 
operation of the dis-embedded self-regulating market (or market society) itself, Polanyi’s 
target was the ideology of market fundamentalism,11 since any economic activity (even that 
of the market society) must always be embedded in a wider set of social institutions.12 
Closely tied to Polanyi’s critique of the dis-embedded market was his notion of the double 
movement, whereby the subjugation of society to the laws of the market (including the 
creeping commodification of land and labour) triggers a ‘spontaneous reaction of “social 
protection”’.13 Discourse on the double movement has been reinvigorated following the 
2008 financial crisis, as comparisons are drawn between the dis-embedding or de-
territorialising advance of neoliberal market society and the time period that concerned 
Polanyi: nineteenth-century Britain. My concern in this essay, however, is not with the 
explicit mobilisation of Polanyian analysis or the use of the idea of double movement by 
critics of international investment law. Rather, it is with the Polanyian form that these 
critiques take, in which ‘capital and the state are regarded as distinctive logics, the first 
inclined to overtake limits, the second emphasising limit as such’, and where ‘there is a 
more or less tacit argument which construes family, race and/or nation as a sanctuary from 
the abstracting violence of the transactional’.14 Hence, critiques of ISDS as neoliberal, which 
point towards a wresting of sovereignty from the market, do not provide an adequate 
response to a present, in which the deep ‘embedding’ of market forces in supposedly 
                                                          
10 G Dale ‘Lineages of embeddedness: on the antecedents and successors of a Polanyian concept’ 70 The 
American Journal of Economics & Sociology 306, 320. Dale notes that while limited reference was made to 
‘embeddedness’ in Polanyi’s major work The Great Transformation, repeated references to embeddedness–
drawing on a range of influences from German Historical School, American Institutionalists and British Social 
Anthropology–appear in Polanyi’s notes and manuscripts. See K Polanyi The Great Transformation (Beacon 
Press, 1957). The wide range of approaches to ‘embeddedness’ Dale refers to can be discerned in the work of 
individual legal scholars. See A Perry-Kessaris ‘Reading the story of law and embeddedness through a 
community lens: a Polanyi-meets-Cotterrell economic sociology of law’ 62 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
(2011) 401, 404; A Perry-Kessaris ‘Prepare your indicators: economics imperialism on the shores of law and 
development’ 7 International Journal of Law in Context (2011) 401, 408.  
11 K Hart  & C Hann ‘Introduction: learning from Polanyi’, in C Hann & K Hart (eds.), The Great Transformation 
Today (Cambridge UP, 2009) 1, 9; S Lakshminarayan ‘Market fundamentalism in the age of “haute finance”: 
the enclosing of policy space in “emerging” India’ 17 ephemera (2017) 849, 852. 
12 See Perry-Kessaris (2011) ‘Prepare your indicators’ 417 
13 G Dale ‘Double movements and pendular forces: Polanyian perspectives on the neoliberal age’ 60 Current 
Sociology (2012) 3, 7. 
14 A Mitropoulos ‘Proliferating limits: the oikonomic limits of capitalist dynamics and technologies of the 
border’ in J Hutnyk (ed.) Beyond Borders (Pavement Books, 2012). 
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contemporary sovereign nation-states actually serves ‘as [the] bedrock for neoliberalism’ 
even though it ‘curiously remains intact’ as a desired alternative for its ‘ostensible critics’.15 
 
There is, thus, a tragic untimely quality to critiques of ISDS as neoliberal and those of ISDS as 
neo-imperial, both of which point towards the reclamation of sovereignty. What, as James 
Sidaway asks, can calls for more sovereignty be expected to produce when putatively failed 
states–crippled by long histories of colonial extraction and ravaged further by the corporate 
beneficiaries of a neoliberal international investment law–seem, on closer inspection, to be 
beset by an excess or surplus of sovereignty?16 I discuss this further below in the context of 
Bangladesh. The economic and territorial fragmentation of postcolonial jurisdictions, 
bisected by an excess of extractive corporate endeavours and state institutions claiming 
authority over decision-making and the authority over life and death, gives the lie to any 
easy notion that there is a welcoming sovereign ground in which such economic activity 
might easily be re-embedded. Critiques of existing ISDS arrangements (whether they are 
framed as neoliberal or neo-imperial) that point towards reclaimed or re-sited sovereignty 
as an emancipatory horizon take on a tragic aspect to the extent that they do not 
adequately respond to, nor point beyond, the broken promises and sovereign excesses of 
the postcolonial present. 
 
At this point, given the many and varied ways in which sovereignty is used as an analytical 
term -and as a formal concept in international law- it is vital to account for the diversity of 
meanings that might be attributed to sovereignty by the authors under discussion, and to 
clarify the sense in which I approach sovereignty in my own analysis. Firstly, there is the 
question of siting sovereignty. For some authors, particularly those working in political 
geography, it is the the territorial or scalar dimension of sovereign authority that receives 
the most considered attention. Whether sovereignty is understood to reside in the ‘general 
will’ of a people, or in a nation-state as the institutionalisation of that will, increasingly, 
emphasis is increasingly placed on the ‘multiple and layered forms of sovereignty’ that 
                                                          
15 A Mitropoulos ‘Uncanny robots and affective labour in the oikonomia’ 18 Cultural Studies Review (2012) 153, 
159. 
16 J Sidaway ‘Sovereign Excesses? Portraying Postcolonial Sovereigntyscapes’ 22 Political Geography (2003) 
157, 160. 
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transect, encompass, and reside within the nation-state.17 Secondly, there is the question of 
the substance of sovereignty, and the related methodological question of how (and where) 
it is to be discovered. Political theorists may begin with a conceptual composite drawn from 
the canon of Western political theory, which takes sovereignty to be made up of territory, 
supremacy, perpetuity, absoluteness and decisionism, and seek out its expression in the 
contemporary world.18 Others are less concerned with the nature of sovereignty as an 
ontological constant than with the historical emergence of sovereignty as a particular 
‘institutional and discursive framework through which we understand legal regimes.’19 It is 
here that most work in the postcolonial critique of international law can be located, 




C. Sovereignty in critiques of ISDS as 'neoliberal' or 'neoimperial' 
 
Neoliberalism is among the most contested of terms in use in the contemporary social 
sciences, with scholars in different traditions treating neoliberalism variously as: a mode of 
governmentality; a set of institutional changes; or a project for the restoration of class 
power.20 While some scholars seek to explain neoliberal formations in terms of the 
principles ‘articulated in canonical urtexts’ produced by neoliberal thinkers like Hayek and 
Friedman,21 others concern themselves with the distinct forms of neoliberalism (or 
neoliberalisation) produced by the encounter between neoliberal thought and existing 
forms of governance in diverse spatial contexts. The frequent association of neoliberalism 
                                                          
17 T Hansen & F Steputtat ‘Sovereignty revisited’ 35 Annual Review of Anthropology 295, 309. See also Stephen 
Legg: “Multiscalar sovereignty encourages us to abandon ‘methodological nationalism’…but we must remain 
aware that sovereignty amounts to the supreme authority within a territory.” S Legg ‘Of Scales, Networks and 
Assemblages: The League of Nations apparatus and the Scalar Sovereignty of the Government of India’ 32 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geography (2009) 234, 240. 
18 See W Brown Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (Zone, 2010), 21-22. 
19 M Wachspress ‘Rethinking Sovereignty with Reference to History and Anthropology’ 5 International Journal 
of Law in Context (2009) 315, 317. 
20 K Birch ‘Market vs. contract? The implications of contractual theories of corporate governance to the 
analysis of neoliberalism’ 16 ephemera (2016) 107, 111-12. 
21 R Venugopal ‘Neoliberalism as concept’ 44 Economy and Society (2015) 165, 166. 
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with de-regulation, small states and free markets22 has, however, created difficulties for 
those who wish to understand the exercise of sovereign power in neoliberal contexts. 
Where is political agency located if the state simply steps back to allow market rule?  
 
Indeed, Kean Birch has recently challenged the notion that ‘neoliberalism is best thought of 
as a market-based order,’ given the extent to which monopolistic tendencies sit comfortably 
with putatively pro-market neoliberal thinkers (and policy-makers). Instead, Birch argues, it 
is ‘freedom to contract,’ and the concomitant proliferation of ready-made asymmetric 
contracts, that constitutes the true essence of neoliberalism.23 There is a clear affinity here 
between the neoliberal emphasis on freedom to contract and the much-critiqued tendency 
for ISDS tribunals to treat states and corporations as equal and symmetrical parties to a 
contract with little regard for a state’s sovereignty or public responsibilities.24 Similarly, Will 
Davies refocuses his historical sociology of neoliberalism away from the ‘logic of markets’ 
and towards the character of neoliberal authority.25 Neoliberal thinkers have been repulsed 
by state planning, but they embrace the uncertainty of market outcomes. Hence the 
neoliberal state must effect a ‘disenchantment of politics by economics’ and exercise its 
sovereign authority by proliferating techniques for measuring and instantiating competition 
in diverse legal, social and cultural domains.26 There is, to be sure, a relationship between 
the ‘neoliberal’ proliferation of measures of competition -which extend to competitions 
between nation-states, sometimes on the basis of the competitiveness of their economies-27 
and ISDS (see below). 
 
Most critical engagements with the neoliberal dimensions of international investment law 
have, however, approached neoliberalism through Foucault’s writings on neoliberal 
                                                          
22 See Ran Hirschl on the ‘ubiquitous neoliberal, small-state social ad economic world-view’ entailing a 
commitment to ‘[d]eregulation and privatization, free and “flexible” markets’ and ‘the removal of “market 
rigidities.”’ R Hirshl Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard 
UP, 2004) 151, 153. 
23 The neoliberal ‘focus on (nexus of) contracts meant that business organization–and hence corporate 
monopoly–could be cast as more efficient than the market where economies of scale led to reduced consumer 
prices’. Birch (2016) 108, 112.  
24 A Shalakany ‘Arbitration and the Third World: a plea for reassessing bias under the spectre of neoliberalism’ 
41 Harvard International Law Journal (2000) 419, 422. 
25 W Davies The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition (SAGE, 2014) 
26 Davies (2014) 4, 27-28; Perry-Kessaris (2011) 409. 
27 Davies (2014) 123.  
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governmentality.28 For example, drawing on Foucault, David Schneiderman argues that 
neoliberalism forms the ‘backdrop of tradition and culture against which global legal 
debates ultimately should be evaluated.’29 The proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) providing for ISDS during the 1990s is taken by Schneiderman to be a reflection of the 
relationship between neoliberalism and political authority. Likewise, the increasingly 
expansive interpretation of what qualifies as an investment (and what qualifies as an 
expropriation) by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
tribunals is treated as an example of globalised ‘neoliberal governmentality’, whereby the 
sovereign steps back or is disqualified from governing investors and economic rationality or 
private authority governs in their stead.30 The purpose of Schneiderman’s critique is, he 
argues, ‘to identify and act upon fissures in transnational norms and forms in ways that will 
liberate states and citizens from the binding constraints of transnational legal strictures.’31 
While there are certainly grounds to accept Schneiderman’s characterisation of 
‘international investment law as an indicator of neo-liberal success’ (see below), equally 
there are reasons to be wary of what is demanded by critiques which frame neoliberalism as 
a ceding of sovereignty to the market. What does vindication call for in response to such 
critiques, if not a reclamation of popular or state sovereignty?  
 
Neoliberalism—or the broadly neoliberal context of the 1990s—also serves an explanatory 
function for Enrique Prieto-Rios. For him, the proliferation of BITs during ‘what is widely 
considered to be the golden age of neoliberalism’ evidences the role of ‘neoliberalism as a 
hegemonic ideology.’32 Like Schneiderman, Prieto-Rios draws on Foucault to identify 
neoliberalism as an expansion of economic rationality that simply requires the state to 
uphold the rule of law for the ‘correct functioning of the market.’33 At the centre of Prieto-
                                                          
28 T Lemke ‘Foucault, governmentality and critique’ 14 Rethinking Marxism (2002) 49. 
29 D Schneiderman ‘Constitutional property rights and elision of the transnational: Foucauldian misgivings’ 24 
Social & Legal Studies (2015) 65, 69. See also Hirschl (2004) 153. 
30 Schneiderman (2015) 79. 
31 Ibid 66-67. 
32 E Prieto-Rios ‘Neoliberal market rationality: the driver of international investment law’ 3 Birkbeck Law 
Review (2016) 55, 59. As Jamie Peck notes, there are reasons to be suspicious of arguments that ‘explain with’ 
neoliberalism, figured as a broad temporal-political context. See J Peck ‘Explaining (with) neoliberalism’ 
Territory, Politics, Governance 1 (2013) 137. Such figurations dispense with tracing the social, documentary 
and institutional relations through which ‘neoliberal’ practices can be imagined to disseminate or scale 
themselves up. 
33 Prieto-Rios (2016) 66. 
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Rios’ critique of international investment law is the extent to which BITs containing ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ and ‘most favoured nation’ clauses require host states to give up their 
‘sovereign right to accept or reject any foreign investment’ and provide the opportunity for 
investors to ‘directly challenge sovereign decisions’ through ISDS, without exhausting local 
remedies.34 The way forward, for Prieto-Rios, involves directly challenging neoliberal 
ideology to ensure that communities affected by investment decisions receive the same 
locus standi as investors: replacing arbitral tribunals with an international court of 
investment; promoting expropriation insurance rather than BITs; and reconsidering the 
forgotten discussion on ‘geo-economic sovereignty and self-determination in terms of 
natural resources’.35  
 
For Sornarajah, the neoliberal order that has enabled the proliferation of BITs containing 
ISDS provisions reiterates the same distinction between ‘civilized’ sovereign states and 
‘uncivilized’ states (which only possess conditional sovereignty) that was made by imperial 
international law.36 International investment law, and especially the norms of ISDS and BITs, 
reflects a ‘climate of neoliberalism,’ insofar as they ‘benefit only multinational corporations 
from developed states’.37 Furthermore, for Sornarajah, the premise that developing nations 
benefit from BITs is utterly fraudulent. Rather, ‘host states lose sovereignty by unnecessarily 
entering into investment treaties’.38 Sornarajah sees in recent decisions: the return of some 
of the principles of the New International Economic Order that make more room for 
regulatory expropriation; the hope for resurgent Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL); and a return to a diplomatic regime of investor protection.39  
 
The emphasis placed by Sornarajah, Prieto-Rios and, to a lesser extent, Schneiderman, on 
ISDS as an instrument which causes states to lose sovereignty is echoed in Van Harten’s 
                                                          
34 Ibid 71. 
35 Ibid 74. 
36 M Sornarajah ‘On fighting for global justice: the role of a Third World international lawyer’ 37 Third World 
Quarterly (1972) 1978. 
37 M Sornarajah ‘International investment law as development law: the obsolescence of a fraudulent system’ in 
M Bungenberg, C Hermann, M Krajewski & J Terhechte (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic 
Law 2016 (Springer, 2016) 209, 212, 216.  
38 Ibid 210, emphasis added. 
39 M Sornarajah ‘A justice-based regime for foreign investment protection and the counsel of the Osgoode Hall 
statement’ 3 Global Policy (2012) 463, 465. For a view hostile to the return of diplomatic protection, drawing 
on the South African case, see Schlemmer (2016) 192. 
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view of ISDS as a ‘threat to democracy and sovereignty’,40 and Peinhardt and Wellhausen’s 
(admittedly less critical) assertion that ISDS commitments as ‘limit[ing] a state’s sovereignty 
and transfer[ring] rights to foreign investors’.41 Enthusiastically pro-ISDS academics like 
Díez-Hochleitner and Remón, on the other hand, take arbitration to be the apogee of a 
distinctively European ‘culture of civility’, and envisage ‘an optimistic scenario for arbitration 
[whereby] the chronic evils of state jurisdiction appear even more visible to a sophisticated 
audience of merchants and entrepreneurs worried about concepts such as competence and 
efficiency’.42 As such, Díez-Hochleitner and Remón appear to provide evidence, from the 
other side so to speak,  of Anthony Anghie’s argument that international investment law is 
‘animated by the civilizing mission’ that draws a line between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ 
jurisdiction, expelling the uncivilized other from the international order until they come to 
act in a civilized manner: granting metropolitan corporations the right to trade without 
impediment.43  
 
But are the discussions over geo-economic sovereignty and self-determination over natural 
resources to which Prieto-Rios refers simply forgotten, or are they, in Gary Wilde’s terms 
‘untimely’?44 There is perhaps reason to ‘cast some doubt on the continued usefulness of a 
discursive strategy in which political change is thought of in terms of a vindicationist 
narrative or liberation or a concept of revolution’, animated by ‘anti-colonial claims to self-
determination and political sovereignty’.45 Is neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism identical to 
neoliberalism, where international investment law is concerned? Is the answer to both to be 
found in reclaiming sovereignty? If so, we must think carefully about where sovereignty is to 
be wrested from, and where its final location might be. Without such consideration, 
critiques of ISDS are destined to take on tragic character, pointing towards desired futures 
(via ‘reclaimed sovereignty’) which already exist as the fragmented ground upon which 
neoliberal or neo-imperial investment law operates. In the next two sections of this essay, I 
                                                          
40 Van Harten (2017) unpaged. 
41 Peinhardt and Wellhausen (2016) 2. 
42 J Díez-Hochleitner & J Remón ‘Dispute resolution systems and global markets: why arbitration?’ in V Pérez-
Diaz (ed) Markets and Civil Society: The European Experience in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, 2014), 132. 
43 A Anghie ‘On critique and the other’ In A Orford (ed.) International Law and its Others (Oxford, 2006) 386, 
394. 
44 Wilde (2015) 37.  
45 Scott (2004) 64-65. 
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outline two cases (one in Bangladesh, one in the UK) in which critiques of ISDS as 
neoliberal/neo-imperial appear to have analytical purchase, but where the the tendency for 
these critiques to point towards a future in which sovereignty is ‘reclaimed’ proves both 
disquieting and untimely. In the Bangladesh case, it is shown that an excess of territorialised 
sovereign violence and authority already accompanies the operation of international 
investment law, while in the UK case a contemporary politics of ‘reclaimed sovereignty’ runs 
up against attempts to project such reclamation as the basis for an emancipated future 
outside the EU.  
 
D. Bangladesh and the tragedy of sovereignty 
 
In this section, I draw on ethnographic research carried out in Bangladesh with lawyers and 
activists concerned with geo-economic sovereignty and the outcomes of ISDS proceedings 
between Bangladesh (or Bangladeshi parastatals) and international oil, gas and mining 
corporations. The Bangladesh case is instructive for thinking about the tragic aspect of the 
pursuit of sovereignty and the critique of international investment law as a hybrid product 
of neoliberalism and neo-imperialism. In part, this is because Bangladesh has been subject 
to an unusually high number of extractive industry-based ICSID arbitrations for a country 
with such a small oil, gas and mineral export economy.46 Additionally, although the impact 
of BITs with ISDS provisions on actual flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains 
contested by both advocates and critics of international investment law, Bangladesh 
appears to be one of just a few countries in which BITs do have the effect of providing 
reassurances that increase inward investment.47 Furthermore, significant figures in the Third 
World jurists movement, such as Kamal Hossain, have been (and continue to be) involved in 
representing Bangladesh in ICSID tribunals and training a new generation of international 
investment lawyers in Dhaka. Hossain was responsible not only for authoring the 
                                                          
46 A Parra The History of ICSID (Oxford UP, 2012) xvi-xxxiv. Notable cases include Scimitar Exploration Limited v 
Bangladesh and Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation [Petrobangla] ARB/92/2 (1992); Scimitar S.p.A v 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh ARB/05/7 (2005); Chevron Bangladesh Block Twelve, Ltd. And Chevron 
Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen and Fourteen Ltd. v People’s Republic of Bangladesh ARB/06/10 (2006) and the 
series of arbitrations taking place since 2011 between Bangladesh/Petrobangla and Niko Resources 
(Bangladesh) Ltd., the subsidiary of a Canadian exploration firm.  
47 C Peinhardt & T Allee ‘Failure to deliver: the investment effects of US preferential economic agreements’ 35 
The World Economy (2012) 757.  
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constitution of independent Bangladesh, but also for designing their first Production Sharing 
Contract (PSC).  
 
The PSC model was adopted in Bangladesh precisely to counter the inequities of colonial 
concessions, and reflects Hossain’s engagement with the Third World jurists’ movement and 
the call for Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources that took place during the 1960s 
and 1970s.48  The occasional willingness of the Bangladeshi state (and its parastatal 
extraction company Petrobangla) to hold out against multinationals’ demands for investor 
friendly PSCs reflects, perhaps, the residue of this Third World jurists’ or ‘Bandung spirit’.49 
Similarly, activist lawyers linked to the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association have 
also utilised a constitutional provision (article 143) which vests in the Republic ‘all minerals 
and other things of value underlying any land of Bangladesh’ to contest the excessively 
favourable terms under which gas fields appear to have been allocated to (allegedly 
negligent) foreign exploration firms.50 
 
However, Bangladesh has also been subject to a number of ‘investment climate reform’ 
initiatives which might be understood as reflecting the imperatives of neoliberal 
international investment law, concerned as they are with promoting competitiveness, 
increasing investor confidence, and removing barriers to FDI.51 One such initiative, backed 
by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) has involved increasing arbitration capacity in Bangladesh—partly as a 
response to the access to justice issues caused by a significant backlog in domestic cases 
(particularly relating to land disputes) and partly to increase the confidence of foreign 
investors in Bangladesh’s investment climate. This initiative, the Bangladesh International 
                                                          
48 K Hossain ‘Introduction’ in K Hossain and S Chowdhury (eds) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
in International Law (Frances Pinter, 1983) ix, xi.  
49 An ‘exploration strike’ and the withdrawal of companies including Conoco Philips and Statoil from bidding 
for offshore oil and gas blocks appeared to be a response to the 2012 Model Production Sharing Contract, 
which overturned provisions in the 2008 Model PSC for an uncapped gas sale price and gas export.  
50 Bangladesh Writ Petition 6911 of 2005, p. 42.  
51 These initiatives include the Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (partly backed by the IFC, the World 
Bank’s private sector arm), IFUSE (Investment Facility for Utilising UK Specialist Expertise) backed by the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), and the work of donor-backed funds designed to stimulate 
private investment such as PIDG (the Private Infrastructure Development Group, predominantly funded by 
DFID).  
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Arbitration Centre (BIAC) was established in 2013 as an arbitration forum and a training 
centre for a new generation of Dhaka-based arbitrators.  
 
With jurists and arbitrators like Kamal Hossain in attendance, questions at one of the first 
BIAC training sessions52 in 2013 turned to rulings that had taken place in controversial ICSID 
tribunals like Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh (ARB/05/7). In 1990, because of local opposition, 
delays to the building of a pipeline resulted in the Italian firm Saipem triggering the 
arbitration clause in their original agreement with Bangladesh and an initial arbitration in 
Dhaka under International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rules in 2000. When the ICC tribunal 
denied a series of procedural requests by the Bangladesh parties (pertaining to comments 
being made public or removed from the record) the Supreme Court in Dhaka issued an 
injunction against the continuation of tribunal. The ICC tribunal nonetheless issued an 
award in 2003, ruling that Saipem had suffered a breach of contract when they were not 
compensated for the time lost due to the local opposition. Petrobangla appealed to the 
Supreme Court, whose ruling was that no award existed, because the ICC had ignored their 
earlier ruling: the award did not exist and could not be enforced. At this point, in 2004, 
Saipem filed a request for arbitration with the Government of Bangladesh at ICSID. 
 
The ICSID award treated the rights to the ICC arbitral award as an investment, and the 
court’s decision to set it aside as an act of expropriation. Such expansive interpretations of 
investment and expropriation are at the heart of the concerns that critics like Sornarajah 
and Prieto-Rios express about the neoliberal/neo-imperial character of aspects of 
international investment law. Cautioning against a retreat from internationalism, Hossain 
nonetheless argued to the trainees at the 2013 BIAC training events that ICSID kept giving 
‘investor-friendly awards’ and would only respect courts that had ‘earned respect by ruling 
against their own country’.53 Indeed, when I interviewed the IFC’s arbitration trainers after 
the BIAC event in 2013, they expressed a conviction that international investors would be 
unlikely to use BIAC, because they ‘want a panel that is not all composed of Bangladeshis’. 
Echoing Díez-Hochleitner and Remón’s view that arbitration is a civilizing practice and 
                                                          
52 During which I was in attendance. Follow-up interviews were subsequently carried out with local and 
international (IFC) lawyers, trainers and trainees. Much of the remainder of this section draws on this material.  
53 Author’s fieldnotes, September 2013. 
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Anghie’s critique of this ‘civilizing mission’, the trainers described themselves as being in 
Bangladesh to ‘spread the rule of law, in a very American way’.54 
 
In a follow-up interview, Hossain described the Saipem case as a scandal: ‘There was this big 
bleating of the company that “the national courts didn’t suit us”, and now the ruling is cited 
boldly, though in international circles all of those agree this is absolutely outrageous’.55 
Hossain was certainly correct: the ruling is cited boldly by political risk analysts and 
international investment lawyers, as I discovered while carrying out a series of observations 
in London at UK government-funded export promotion agencies from 2013-2015. Saipem v. 
Bangladesh was singled out by trainers as an example of the creative possibilities afforded 
by international investment law. These training sessions reflected a definitive ‘pro-business’ 
approach to international investment law, one that encourages antipathy towards the 
exercise by post-colonial states (frequently treated as suspect by default) of regulatory 
powers likely to result in reduced future earnings for foreign corporations.56  
 
Critiques of ISDS and the practice of international investment law as neoliberal and neo-
imperial both appear relevant to the Bangladesh case. The neoliberal and the neo-imperial 
appear to intertwine in the donor-funded efforts to promote attractive investment climates 
conducive to investor protection and in the attitudes of IFC trainers and UK-based legal 
advisers towards arbitration as a tool for creatively extracting revenue and circumventing 
the courts in (putatively sovereign) post-colonial states.57 But, as argued above, the critiques 
of ISDS as neoliberal and neo-imperial share a concern with sovereignty, in particular with 
the loss of sovereignty. The anticipated future conjured by these critiques is, then, one in 
which sovereignty is reclaimed, or at least flows elsewhere, away from markets and 
corporations towards states and the populace. As I have argued throughout this essay, there 
                                                          
54 P Gilbert ‘Speculating on Sovereignty: Money Mines and Corporate Foreign Policy at the Extractive Industry 
Frontier’ (under review). 
55 Interview with author, December 2013. 
56 See P Comeaux & N Kinsella ‘Reducing political risk in developing countries: bilateral investment treaites, 
stabilization clauses, and MIGA & OPIC investment insurance’ 15 New York Law School Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 3. For more recent examples, see Schlemmer (2016) 190, 192; also M Kantor ‘Indirect 
expropriation and political risk insurance for energy projects’ Journal of World Energy Law and Business 8 
(2015) 173. 
57 As Michael Goldhaber notes, Saipem effectively overruled the Bangladeshi courts and ‘performed the role of 
an appellate chamber’, even if the arbitrators claimed the opposite. M Goldhaber ‘The rise of arbitral power 
over domestic courts’ 1 Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation (2013) 373, 389. 
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is something untimely and tragic about this form of critique. The Bandung spirit, which 
animated calls for Third World sovereignty against the totalising project of colonial 
domination, now lies if not in ruins, then at least ‘fragmented’.58  
 
In the specific case of Bangladesh, the Bandung spirit had evaporated prematurely as India 
and Pakistan were drawn into Cold War affiliations that determined the shape of 
Bangladesh’s liberation struggle in 1971. Moreover, Third World support for the sovereignty 
of Bangladesh was muted by a commitment to non-interference.59 Neverthless, here we can 
see, in David Scott’s terms, that future -to which anti-colonial critiques oriented towards 
(re)claiming sovereignty once spoke- has now become our fragmented present. Thus, 
continued calls for sovereignty made against the neo-imperialism of international 
investment law possesses a tragic quality.60 Similarly, critiques of international investment 
law as neoliberal -while not without purchase on projects to build arbitration capacity for 
the benefit of foreign investors- also point towards a future in which sovereignty flows away 
from markets and corporations, towards states and the people. But such critiques are 
possessed of an equally tragic quality, which comes all to clearly into view when the 
operation of sovereign authority is examined more closely in relation to Bangladesh’s 
resource politics.  
 
On 26th August 2006, a protest against a proposed open-pit coal mine at Phulbari, in north-
west Bangladesh, resulted in the death of five people when security forces opened fire on 
the crowd marching towards the local office of Asia Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
the London-listed junior GCM Resources. The protest centred on the possibility that the 
mine would displace between 40,000 and half a million people; seriously impact upon the 
local water table; and compensate displaced residents with cash that would hardly make 
amends for the hardships that come with landlessness in rural Bangladesh.61 Those who lost 
                                                          
58 V Kanwar ‘Not a Place but a Project: Bandung, TWAIL, and the Aesthetics of Thirdness’ in L Eslava, M Fakhri 
and V Nesia (eds) Bandung, Global History and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures 
(Cambridge, 2017). 
59 C Chowdhury ‘From Bandung 1955 to Bangladesh 1971: Oppressed Populations, Self-Determination and 
Third Worldist Failures in South Asia’ in L Eslava, M Fakhri and V Nesia (eds) Bandung, Global History and 
International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (Cambridge, 2017). 
60 Scott (2004, 2014). 
61 S Numerowla ‘Land, place and resistance to development in Phulbari, Bangladesh’ SAMAJ (2016) available at 
https://samaj.revues.org/4113 (Last visited 5 October 2017). 
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their lives are now commemorated annually on Phulbari Day as martyrs, by the tel-gas 
samiti (National Committee), a coalition of left-wing organisations and academics opposed 
to foreign ownership of Bangladeshi resources. The legality of the still-stalled Phulbari 
project is contested by a number of activists, including one senior figure in the National 
Committee who claims that a document signed by a then-government minister has 
rendered the project invalid.62 
 
More recently, the National Committee has been active in mobilising against the Rampal 
Power Plant, a coal-fired plant under construction in the UNESCO World Heritage Site of the 
Sundarbans. Imagery deployed in the marches mobilised against Rampal have reflected 
concerns over the involvement of India’s National Thermal Power Corporation in the 
construction of the project,63 framed as a potential threat to Bangladesh’s economic 
sovereignty. Another coal-fired power plant to be built as a partnership between a politically 
influential Bangladeshi energy firm and a Chinese power group, at Banshkhali, was again the 
site of shootings in 2016, resulting in the death of four protestors opposing the lack of 
consultation and the possibility of displacement.64  
 
What sense does it make to speak of a loss of sovereignty in this context? Certainly, Anghie 
and Sornarajah’s critique of international investment law—as a system predicated on 
designating the ‘uncivilized other’, de-recognising their formal sovereign authority and only 
re-instating that recognition upon the granting of extraction and trading rights to foreign 
corporations—has purchase in the Bangladesh case. But from the perspective of those who 
understand sovereignty as a ‘tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in 
violence,’65 the shootings in Phulbari and Banshkhali can also be understood as sovereign 
outbursts. Certainly, these shootings are hardly evidence of a lack or loss of sovereignty by 
the post-colonial Bangladeshi state. These were acts perpetrated by state forces, albeit 
within a framework ‘configured not simply by an absence of connection, power and capital, 
                                                          
62 ‘When a minister signs something, it is official and unless the next government reverses that it must be 
followed’  (Interview, November 2013).  
63 P Gilbert ‘Crowds, Courts & Corporations: Capitalizing on Varieties of Sovereignty in Bangladesh’s Extractive 
Industries’ (2017) Paper presented at Utrecht University, April 26. 
64 C Kotikalapudi ‘Corruption, crony capitalism and conflict: rethinking the political economy of coal in 
Bangladesh and beyond’ (2017) 17 Energy Research & Social Science 160. 
65 Hansen & Stepputat (2006). 
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but by a particular form and experience (conceivably a surplus) of these’.66 For some, the 
Bangladeshi state’s willingness to exercise ‘sovereignty as domination’ (in some cases, in 
support of the apparent interests of foreign resource investors) reflects a paternalistic form 
of authority designed to ‘protect the masses from their own unruly nature.’67 But to view 
this polity willing to dominate its citizenry (sometimes configured by a surplus of corporate 
power) as that within which sovereignty may be restored or re-embedded is, arguably, to 
confuse the expression of anticolonial desires for national independence with the form that 
contemporary projects of emancipation ought to take. 
 
E. Sovereignty after neoliberalism: Anti-ISDS activism in Europe 
 
In this final section, I move to the European context to look at the manner in which critiques 
over TTIP and ISDS have been articulated (or deflected). My intention is not to challenge the 
critiques made by legal scholars who identify ISDS with neoliberalism (or neo-imperialism), 
and it is certainly not to defend the justifications provided by scholars, policymakers and 
legal practitioners sympathetic to ISDS and its original inclusion in the TTIP negotiations, 
prior to the EU’s move to establish a multi-lateral investment court in its stead. Indeed, as I 
demonstrate below, many aspects of the rationale outlined by defenders of TTIP and ISDS fit 
rather neatly into the Foucauldian conception of neoliberalism advanced by legal scholars 
like Schneiderman and Prieto-Rios and the broader understanding of neoliberalism 
proffered by sociologists like Davies. But when politicians apparently hostile to the 
neoliberal ‘disenchantment of politics by economics’,68 and populist movements which 
privilege sovereignty over market function, gain significant support in the traditional Anglo-
American strongholds of neoliberalism, calls for more sovereignty begins to look more like 
tragedy than political romance. 
  
ISDS is certainly not the only grounds on which protest against TTIP has been organised. The 
mid-2016 TTIP leaks showed at least some of the consumer safety and health-related 
                                                          
66 Sidaway (2003) 160, original italics. 
67 N Chowdhury ‘Picture Thinking: Sovereignty and Citizenship in Bangladesh’ 87 Anthropological Quarterly 
(2014) 1257, 1258. 
68 Davies (2014) 4. 
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concerns articulated in social protest against TTIP to be well-founded, and these replaced 
ISDS in many activists’ priorities. Nonetheless, the arguments made in favour of ISDS by pro-
TTIP academics are worth evaluating in light of the critiques of ISDS as neoliberal or neo-
imperial discussed above. For its defenders like Pelkmans, TTIP would in fact have offered a 
‘much improved’69 ISDS, a claim that is also made in relation to Christian Tietje and Freya 
Baetens’ report on ISDS made to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There it was argued 
that ‘the benefits of ISDS will outweigh the costs’.70 This claim is enabled by the 
presentation of ISDS as a fundamentally neutral (if not positive) development in historical 
terms: the culmination of dispute resolution provisions that replaced diplomatic measures, 
emerging from Euro-American Treaties of Amity in the eighteenth century.71 There is no 
reference to the postcolonial critiques of international law that depict ISDS as an outcome 
of uneven encounters between Euro-American sovereigns and colonial or developing 
nations whose sovereignty was only recognised when it was partially relinquished. Tietje 
and Baetens were equally optimistic that new BITs can include exemption clauses for 
environmental and taxation clauses, and recommended including a statement in TTIP that 
parties should retain their right to regulate in areas where there might be public interest 
consequences.72 Elsewhere, Baetens argued that ISDS should not really be of any concern in 
terms of ‘limiting the policy space’, since ‘all obligations that a state undertakes “limit” its 
policy space: promising to do A may affect how one can do B’.73  
 
Such ahistorical and depoliticising accounts of the norms of arbitration perpetuate precisely 
the vision of international investment law which the anti-neoliberal and anti-imperial 
critiques outlined above take as their object. On the one hand, Tietje and Baetens’ account 
                                                          
69 J Pelkmans ‘TTIP: Definition, Rationale and Significance’ 6 Intereconomics (2015) 312, 315-316. 
70 C Tietje & F Baetens ‘The impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership’. Study prepared for the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (2014) (MINBUZA-2014.78850) 8. Cost-Benefit analysis is 
frequently depicted as a quintessentially neoliberal technique, allowing as it does the evaluation of different 
policy proposals on competitive, marketised lines. However, as Samuel Knafo and colleagues argue, such 
techniques owe less to the ‘free market’ prescriptions of neoliberal ideologues like Hayek and Friedman, and 
more to the innovations in managerial technique incubated by the RAND Corporation. S Knafo, S Dutta, R Lane 
& S Wyn-Jones ‘The managerial lineages of neoliberalism’ New Political Economy, forthcoming. 
71 Tietje & Baetens (2014) 15-20. 
72 Ibid 105. 
73 F Baetens ‘Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection–A response to Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee’ In D 
Hamilton & J Pelkmans (eds.) Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015) 187, 197. 
This article has been accepted for publication in London Review of International Law Published by 
Oxford University Press. See https://academic.oup.com/lril/ for the definitive version 
 19 
 
continues the long Euro-American history of treating Third World sovereignty as conditional, 
subject only to the foreigner’s right to trade. The spirit of Bandung and the efforts of the 
TWAIL and Third World jurists to shape another international investment law -rather than 
merely ‘enter’ European-derived international investment law- disappear in their analysis. 
On the other hand, the flattening of all public commitments into limitations on possible 
policy space works as ‘an effective means for shielding the economic sphere from the 
potential hazards of regulation and redistribution’.74 But it is when these critiques are 
harnessed to images of neoliberalism as a constraint on ‘good’ sovereignty that problems 
arise, and their untimely, tragic tenor is brought into focus.  
 
Influential scholar-activists critical of TTIP and its ISDS provisions have shared a great deal 
with the legal and sociological critiques of neoliberalism outlined above. For critics of TTIP, 
the negotiations around regulatory cooperation generated concerns over the prospect of a 
‘race to the bottom’ in a variety of health, environmental and food standards, while the 
inclusion of ISDS in negotiations about the rules governing the Partnership meant ‘TTIP 
[was] likely to undermine national sovereignty’.75 Susan George, influential among many 
TTIP activists in the UK, articulated her concern with TTIP on the basis that it furthered the 
neoliberal rise of shadow sovereigns, whereby ‘the functions of legitimate government are 
progressively being taken over by illegitimate, unelected, opaque agents and 
organisations’.76 On ISDS, George charged, ‘The EU obviously accepts this denial of 
sovereignty and affront to democratic institutions as A Good Thing’.77 
 
If the denial of sovereignty is the form taken by domination, then reclamation of that 
sovereignty is conjured as the form that revolution or vindication must take. But calls for 
reclamations of sovereignty were forthcoming from other quarters between 2014-16, 
causing significant friction between pro- and anti-Brexit TTIP activists in the run-up to the 
June 2016 referendum in the UK.78 Indeed, following the immediate aftermath of the Brexit 
                                                          
74 Hirschl (2004) 153. 
75 G Moody ‘You thought ISDS was bad? TTIP’s “regulatory cooperation” is even worse’ 19 January 2016, 
available at http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/01/you-thought-isds-was-bad-ttips-regulatory-
cooperation-is-even-worse/ (last accessed 05 October 2016). 
76 S George Shadow Sovereigns: How Global Corporations are Seizing Power (Polity, 2015) 5. 
77 Ibid 95. 
78 Based on personal observations and participation in anti-TTIP campaign groups based in London. 
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vote, one of the editors of their earlier 2007 volume, Politics without Sovereignty  (whose 
argument was that the ‘shared antipathy towards a final authority in politics’ unified all 
strands of international relations and law scholarship, enabling the transformation of 
governance into ‘dreary administration’ in the absence of ‘ideologically charged party 
politics’)79 proclaimed the referendum’s outcome as a vindication for their theoretical 
position.80 The sovereignty mourned by the contributors to this volume was not absolutist 
‘Westphalian’ sovereignty, but the notion that government should ‘flow from the will of the 
people’. Without sovereignty there would be only the ‘merely mechanical in social 
development’ and no ‘robust, determined political individuals, pursuing their idea of the 
good life in a more rational social order’.81  
 
Recalling Will Davies’ understanding of neoliberalism as an attempt to retain the liberal 
commitment to uncertain outcomes (ostensibly ensured by market-type competition) and 
rejecting the politics of planning so loathed by Hayek, this argument for sovereignty appears 
to be an argument against neoliberalism. In the context of the European project, it was 
argued by contributors to Politics without Sovereignty that the neoliberal settlement in the 
European Union was the outcome of a ‘struggle by the elites to reduce public expectations 
upon the state’ that was ‘too successful’, leading to a situation where ‘elites also recoil from 
responsibility for political decision-making’.82 Several political economists more critical of 
the Brexit vote also viewed it as an outburst of sovereign expression, equivalent to a 
Polanyian re-embedding of economy in society, as ‘an inchoate and incoherent attempt to 
subordinate unfettered globalised markets in money, trade, and labour to the interests of 
British society’.83 But we should perhaps take a pause given the violent, exclusionary politics 
that have accompanied what might seem at times like an anti- or post-neoliberal turn 
                                                          
79 C Bickerton, P Cunliffe & A Gourevitch ‘Introduction: the unholy alliance against sovereignty’ In C Bickerton, 
P Cunliffe and A Gourevitch (eds.) Politics without Sovereignty: a Critique of Contemporary International 
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November 2016).  
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towards economic nationalism and protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic.84 In such a 
context, critiques of contemporary trade agreements and ISDS as neoliberal are in danger of 
finding their answer exhausted, or even pre-empted by a politics to which few of these 




Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Bangladesh and analysis of anti-TTIP 
activism in the UK, this essay has interrogated the work that ‘sovereignty’ does in anti-
neoliberal and postcolonial critiques of ISDS. It has identified a tendency to present critiques 
of ISDS (and international investment law more broadly) as a fundamentally neoliberal 
formation that privileges the sovereign authority of corporations and of market rule itself, 
and/or as a product of neo-imperial international law that discounts the sovereign authority 
of post-colonial jurisdictions where their decisions threaten the profitability of transnational 
corporations.  
 
The essay does not challenge these critiques as they shed light on the operations of 
international investment law. Indeed, the examples from Bangladesh (the use of ISDS as an 
appellate court in Saipem) and the UK (in economists’ approach to ISDS as narrowing the 
policy space like any other measure) seem to substantiate these critiques. But, drawing on 
David Scott,85 I am concerned with the temporal mismatch between modes of critique 
formulated in response to a particular historical juncture and their articulation in the 
present. If anti-colonial and Third World critiques of international investment law identified 
as their problem an unequal system that designated certain jurisdictions uncivilized and 
unworthy of sovereign authority in their dealings with transnational corporations, then 
decolonisation and reclaimed national sovereignty emerged clearly as solutions. Likewise, if 
                                                          
84 Mitropoulos in fact cautions against reading populist and protectionist politicians as ‘post-neoliberal, arguing 
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critiques of ISDS as fundamentally neoliberal see its support for ‘market rule’ through the 
denial of state sovereignty as the problem, then the re-embedding of economic activity in a 
reclaimed state or popular sovereignty emerges as the solution. In both cases presented 
here—the postcolonial state which is undermined by the same extractive corporations to 
which it provides violent support in Bangladesh, and the regressively re-embedded context 
in the UK—the futures to which these critiques point have now been left behind, and calls 
for reclaimed sovereignty of the putatively good kind appear tragically untimely. As we 
begin to discover what comes after neoliberalism, and when postcolonial nation-states 
exercise hard-won formal sovereignty authority by entering into fragmented alliances with 
violently extractive corporations, the problem-space of international investment law is 
necessarily shifting, even if the futures to which our critiques must point have not yet come 
into view.  
